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WORKING GROUP ON
INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS |
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ACHEHNESE DELEGATION PAPER On behalf of the Achehnese people and our leader the Head of State of the Government in Exile, Teungku Dr. Teungku Hasan Muhammad di Tiro, we the Achehnese Delegation wish to thank the Secretariat of the WGIP for inviting us to present our view and the case of the Acheh conflict at this august meeting. It is a great honour indeed for us and opportunity that mark another step forward in our long struggle for survival of our people. Indeed, in this march of globalization where the trend is for regional unification in order to strengthen common interest, the small indigenous peoples are in danger of being not only neglected but crushed, willingly by the bigger oppressive powers or unwittingly in the quest for the perceived “greater good”. The small indigenous peoples are like the endangered flora and fauna specie that need protection not just for their own sake but for the natural variety of genes of life on this planet, the loss of which would be devastating for all in the long run. Too many small nations have already perished, their languages and cultures lost forever. It is indeed about time that this great Organisation of mankind to start the measure to protect those still remaining but in danger of disappearing, be it from unwitting victimization or from outright oppression like the case of our people, the Achehnese. The case of Acheh In the 19 century Acheh had a population of around 10 million with territories spreading all along the coastal areas of the island of Sumatra to the Malay peninsular. Today, after the continuous independent wars with three different colonial powers since 1873: the Dutch, the Japanese, and now the Indonesians, the size of the population has been reduced to around 4 million living in an area of about 182, 828 square miles. This reduction in extent and numbers was compounded by Indonesia’s colonial policies, as manifested in its transmigration program. An Indonesian Minister of Transmigration, Martono, said in 1986 that: “With transmigration we are implementing what we have promised: to gather and to unite the entire ethnics into a single people, the people of Indonesia. The different ethnics will gradually disappear and at the end there will be only one type of people”. The then Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces and Minister of Defence, General Benny Murdani, echoed this sentiment which clearly shows that the policy was set up as a deliberate plan to ‘de-Achenize’ Acheh. He said: ‘Transmigration is a program that cannot be separated from the national security and defense consideration. To prepare places or lands and to annihilate all obstacles existing there. We need to give special attention to the selection of these places, a policy that is directly connected to the territorial administration concept”. With the drastic transmigration policy, the Javanese population in Acheh grew from negligible to over 10 per cent within ten years of the Military Operation Area (DOM) period of 1989-1998, taking the most productive land areas and occupying the best jobs. The trouble with attempting to create a singular nation within the state and eliminating ethnic diversity as the two former ministers had clearly envisaged is that Java, with a population of over 130 million, will certainly not disappear to become ‘Indonesian’. It is the smaller peoples, like the Achehnese, who would have been diluted to insignificance, had this cynical project not collapsed together with its promoter, General Suharto. History Acheh has been known to explorers since quite very early in the Western quest to the East. A Portuguese explorer portraying the island of Sumatra as effectively round gave the name of a place in the northern part of the island as Achem. But the well documented history of Acheh is interwoven with the spread of Islam in the region in which it was the prime mover. The island of Sumatra itself was derived from the name of the East Acheh Samudra Pasè’s Hindu kingdom that later converted to Islam. Islam first entered Acheh around 700 AD. The first Islamic kingdom, the Sultanate of Peureulak, a prosperous trading post, was established in 804 and over the next 600 with two other Sultanate, Pasè and Acheh Rayeuk (Greater Acheh) formed the original Nanggroe Acheh Darussalam federation, known as the Acheh Lhèë Sagoe (Triangle of Acheh), that reached its peak in the 16th to 18th century, having established trading links with China, Europe and the newly emerged United States of America., its ships sailed as far north as Oslo. With the advance of the Western colonialism, Acheh formed an alliance with Turkey. To face the Portuguese and Dutch threats, Acheh also signed a Treaty of Perpetual Friendship with Great Britain In 1819 strengthening the Trade Agreement signed in 1603 Traditional Achehnese Administration Acheh is a trading society that is anchored to a strong agricultural base. In their agricultural set-up, they are steeped in a tradition of a collective system of living. In the political realm, Acheh has known a complex balance of power that approximates the democratic conception of the separation of powers since the peak of its existence during the rule of its greatest king, Sultan Iskandar Muda (1609-1636). This paradigm of power-sharing was expressed as: ‘Adat bak Po Teumeureuhom, Hukom bak Syah Kuala, Kanun bak Putroe Phang, Reusam bak Bentara’, that places the political power, the law, the tradition, and the making of regulations in different hands. This separation of powers was practiced from the very top of Achehnese political society to the lowest village level, where the geuchik, village chieftain, heads the administration, assisted by the village imam (priest) and two councils of four and eight elders. The imam interprets the laws, the council of four elders implements them and the council of eight elders serves as a sort of local parliament. The people elect all bearers of these offices. In 2000, the liberated areas ruled by the Free Acheh Movement covered more than 70 per cent of Acheh. With the weakening of Indonesian administration, the traditional system returned and was enthusiastically welcomed by the people. Today, although many of these areas have been reoccupied by Indonesian troops, the system remains strong and the people simply refuse to participate in the Indonesian system. As a result of the increased military campaign by the TNI in Acheh after 1999, and the lack of public clarity about the structure and intentions of GAM, in July 2002, a large group of representatives of pro-independence Achehnese communities from around the world gathered in Stavanger, Norway, and asked their supreme leader, Dr. Teungku Hasan di Tiro to change the structure of their struggle to a formalized statehood. This state is now known as Neugara Acheh (State of Acheh), governed by the Peumeurintah Neugara Acheh (Government of the State of Acheh), with its military wing, formerly known as Angkatan Gerakan Acheh Merdeka (Free Acheh Movement Forces, or AGAM) being called Teuntra Neugara Acheh – TNA - (Acheh National Armed Forces). The Stavanger Declaration stipulates, among other things, that the system of government of the State of Acheh is to be based on democratic principles. The Conflict To understand the conflict in Acheh, it is necessary to go back to its roots, and to Acheh’s status as a significant and long-standing independent state. The French noted that: ‘In 1582, the Achehnese had already extended their preponderance over the islands of the Sundas, over one part of the Malay peninsula, and having relations with all the states trading across the Indian Ocean from Japan to Arabia. The history of the long struggle that the Achehnese sustained against the Portuguese who were established in Malacca from the beginning of the 16th century was a further glorious page in the history of the Achehnese people”. In 1871 Britain unilaterally withdrew from the Perpetual Treaty of Friendship with Acheh opening the way for Dutch intervention. On 26 March 1873, the Dutch declared war with Acheh. The United States, Britain, France, Italy, Austro-Hungary and other countries that had recognized Acheh as a sovereign State declared their official neutrality in the conflict. This was the start of the Achehnese problems that remain unresolved, the Dutch colonial misdeed being inherited by its colonial successor state, the Republic of Indonesia. The name Indonesia itself is derived from Indos Nesos (Indian islands), a name given to the Southeast Asian archipelagos by a German writer in the 19th century. To the local inhabitants, this archipelago was known as Nusantara or ‘islands in between’ (the Indian and Pacific oceans). The Dutch called it Indonetie, comprising the islands ‘owned’ by the Dutch United East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, or VOC). When the VOC went bankrupt, what was otherwise known as the Dutch East Indies was taken over by the Dutch Government as a colony. But this colony did not include Acheh, which by treaty was recognized as an independent State and not a part of the VOC’s territories. The Dutch war, which lasted from 1873 until 1913 (but which continued in guerrilla form thereafter), inflicting more casualties on the Dutch Army than all its other colonial wars combined, and was never able to fully subdue the Achehnese. The Dutch occupation lasted until 1942, when they were chased out by the Japanese, and the three-year Japanese occupation remained just that, a military occupation, with no formal surrender of sovereignty. On 17 August 1945 Sukarno proclaimed the independence of Indonesia, but the transfer of sovereignty only took place in December 1949. Consequently, between 1945 and 1949 Acheh effectively regained its independence, with not a single foreign official remaining within its borders. At the defeat of the Japanese, there was an attempt by the Dutch to return to Indonesia behind the Allied Forces, mainly the British, but their advance was fiercely opposed by Achehnese freedom fighters. On March 25 1947 the Linggarjati Agreement was signed in Rijswijk Palace (now the Merdeka presidential palace in Jakarta), by Indonesian leaders and representatives of the Dutch colonial government recognisisng Indonesian sovereignty over parts Sumatra (that did not include Acheh), Java and Madura and cooperation with the Dutch to establish a United States of Indonesia (RIS) with the Republic of Indonesia, whose territory was the tiny central Java Sultanate of Yogyakarta and its surrounding being one of the States. On January 17 this accord was followed by the Renville Agreement signed on board of the Allied battle ship of the same name, focusing on the demarcation of lines and territories and recognized as the Republic of Indonesia as one of the State of RIS thus comprising 16 States altogether. Both documents were matters of consideration in the 406th UN General Assembly resulting in the UN Resolution No. 67 (1949) that recognized the United States of Indoensia. On May 7, 1949, on the basis of this Resolution, the emergency Indonesian government held a new dialogue with the Dutch in Jakarta and signed an agreement confirming both sides would attend the Round Table Conference in The Hague, for expediting the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to RIS as already recognized by the UN Resolution 67 (1949). On 27 December 1949, following pressure from the United Nations, the Dutch surrendered sovereignty of their colony to the Republic of Indonesia. There is no mention of Acheh in that document of sovereignty transfer, as indeed it concerns only the territories of the Dutch East Indies, which does not include Acheh. There is no document whatsoever demonstrating that Acheh had voluntarily joined the newly created nation of Indonesia. Acheh was thus fraudulently included later in the newly formed Republic. Acheh was initially inserted as a Province which was later abolished and incorporated in the Province of North Sumatra. In 1953, as a consequence of Acheh’s loss of autonomy, Governor Daud Beureueh proclaimed that Acheh had joined the Darul Islam Rebellion, which had been underway in West Java and South Sumatra since 1950. While the rebellion in those provinces was intended to force Indonesia into becoming an Islamic state, Acheh’s participation in the rebellion was to assert its independence, especially after 1955, and it retained only the loosest of political associations with the other parts of the rebellion. By 1959, the government in Jakarta had agreed to give Acheh ‘special autonomy’ in the fields of religion, education and culture, although this was not accepted by Daud Beureuh and his movement until 1963. In the following years, particularly from the late 1960s, as Indonesia increasingly became a centralised state, Acheh came under the direct economic control of Jakarta and its generals, which created an environment of exploitation and corruption. The Achehnese people felt that they had again been betrayed by Jakarta. In 1975, the eighth descendant of the great Achehnese leader Teungku Tjhik di Tiro (who was asked to rule Acheh by the Royal Council when the Sultan was killed in battle and his son was still an infant), Dr. Hasan Muhammad di Tiro, came back to Acheh from a long sojourn in the US to inform the Achehense through a series of lectures about the rights of the Achehnese for self-determination. On 4 December 1976 he announced the ‘re-declaration’ of the independence of Acheh and took the title of his great-great-great grandfather, Wali Nanggroe (Guardian of the State). The Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), which he formed as the vehicle for the independence struggle, became known locally as Gerakan Acheh Merdeka (Free Acheh Movement, or GAM). President Suharto immediately instructed his generals to launch what he called a ‘shock therapy’ operation against anyone suspected of supporting what he called Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan (GPK-Gang of Peace Disturbers). One of his henchmen, who later became Minister of Home Affairs, Syarwan Hamid, said: ‘Anyone who even gives a cigarette to a GAM deserves decapitation’. But Indonesian military operations failed to crush the freedom fighters. In 1989, after its initial military campaign from 1976, the Indonesian government poured in its elite Kopassus (Special Forces) and other military units, declaring the province virtually under military rule with the infamous DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer or Military Operation Territory) decree. During this period, nearly 30 000 Achehnese civilians - men, women, children and the elderly - were tortured and murdered, and hundreds of houses and shops were burnt to the ground. Corpses were left to rod at bus stands and roadsides in order to frighten the people. In December 1998 DOM was lifted after the fall of Suharto, but was soon replaced by the Pasukan Pengawal Rusuhan Massa (Mass Riots Control Force - known by its acronym PPRM). It is a special force that unites most of the Indonesian special armed units, including the Marines, Intelligence, Brimob (the paramilitary police), with the Army at its core. Later operations were called Operasi Cinta Meunasah (Love Your Mosque Operation) - series I, II and III – which were several of the most brutal repressive operations launched by Indonesia in Acheh. Then came the reformation of the discredited and disbanded territorial command, the KODAM (Military Regional Command) Iskandar Muda that has since become the local executor of Jakarta’s military policy. Its re-establishment was a measure to overcome the call for withdrawal of the ‘non-organic’ (non-local) military units. New reinforcements would theoretically be under the ‘localised’ KODAM command. The result was the deaths of thousands more Achehnese between 1999 and December 2003. The Peace Process On 9 December 2002, following growing pressure from some politicians in Jakarta and increasing concern being expressed by the international community, the Indonesian government and GAM agreed to a ceasefire, known as the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) mediated by the Swiss based NGO Henry Dunant Centre that was strongly supported by Western powers, under which both sides would withdraw and refrain from hostilities while a political outcome was negotiated. It was quite clear from the beginning that Indonesia had no intention of respecting the CoHA. It was evident from statements of high ranking civilian and military leaders that for the Indonesian government, the Agreement was just a way to get much needed financial assistance for its collapsing economy after the devastating monetary crisis. Following agitation in the field that included attacks by military backed militia groups of several mediators’ offices, vehicles and personnel, resulted in the withdrawal of the small Thai and Filipino ceasefire monitoring contingents, the COHA Agreement collapsed.
On May
18 2003, the Tokyo Conference for Peace and Reconstruction of Acheh
summoned both sides to a Joint Commission meeting of COHA in Tokyo to try
to salvage the ceasefire. The Indonesian military in Acheh arrested on
their way to the airport and subsequently held hostage 5 of the members of
the Achehnese negotiating team, while those coming from Sweden continued
with the meeting in Tokyo in respect of the wish of the international
community. In Tokyo, after a very hard bargaining with the mediators, the
Achehnese accepted the Indonesian proposal with some changes. Half an hour
before midnight the Indonesian delegation torn off its own initial
proposal and gave the Achehnese an ultimatum to surrender. At midnight,
the Indonesian Government declared the implementation of the Martial Law
in Acheh, supposedly for just 6 months, its military having pledged that
it required only 3 months to crush the Free Acheh Movement. In the morning
of May 19, Jakarta brought in by land, sea and air 50 000 more troops to
Acheh, complimenting the existing 35 000 already in operation there. But
after 6 months of brutal oppression with the killing of thousands of
civilians, the torching of more than a thousands schools, hundred of
villages, dozens of market places and thousands of houses, the arrest and
detention of thousands of innocent civilians, the exiling of hundreds of
alleged GAM members to Java, the sentencing to long jail sentences (13 to
15 years) of the 5 GAM negotiators and other well-known human rights
activists, the pledged crushing of GAM is still beyond reach for the
Indonesian military. They asked Jakarta and obtained an extension of
another 6 months of the Martial Law. After another 6 months and the
killings of thousands more, still unable to solve the conflict by force,
Jakarta is now camouflaging its oppressive and brutal actions in Acheh
under the new set-up called the Civil Emergency Situation, with all the
troops remaining in place, Acheh completely close to foreign view and
atrocities continue unabated, prompting the US Government to issue a very
strong condemnation of Indonesia that includes this observation: “Members
of the [Indonesian] security forces, including from the Army's Special
Forces (Kopassus) and the Police Mobile Brigade Conclusion Indonesia has always maintained that the conflict in Acheh is its internal problem. It claims that Acheh was “a tribe among many others of the Indonesian people”. This is of course a ridiculous fallacy as “the Indonesian people” came about only in 1945. Or if one were to accept the “Indonesian Youth Oath” comprising mainly of Javanese representatives, the “Indonesian people” was born in 1928 with the declaration in this oath: “One People, One Nation, One Language”. Even the language is not its own, but one developed from the Malay language. On the other hand, the Achehnese have existed as a people for more than 1000 years and they had already established a sovereign state hundreds of years before one even heard of the word of Indonesia. The inclusion of Acheh into the Republic of Indonesia was a gross fraud committed with the participation of the United Nations. It is thus the duty of the United Nations to correct this mistake./. |
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